We see a lot of confusion in the market around when to begin negotiations. It’s not an insignificant consideration. In fact, when you begin can make a huge difference in the outcome. It’s understandable that tenants would not know when to start. Brokers are not always keen to start at the right time, since compensation is derived by transacting and the closer the tenant is to lease expiration, the faster it will need to transact (and the fewer options it will have). Good for the broker, bad for the tenant. This creates a misalignment of interests that discourages thoughtful consultation on the front end – the more time a broker spends on a project, the lower the compensation.
Throughout 2020, the prevailing sentiment among investors in the San Francisco office market was one of relative optimism. After all, despite the fact tenants were prohibited from occupying their buildings, they continued to collect full rent. The buildings were full, with vacancy hovering around 4%. Sure, companies weren’t happy about paying for space they couldn’t use, but business was good. In many cases the tech sector (which makes up most of San Francisco’s office occupancy) was booming due to an even greater reliance on and usage of tech caused by pandemic driven changes in how people were living. Throughout the course of 2020 there was no reason for San Francisco investors to panic, as few (if any) office occupiers were showing signs of developing long-term hybrid or remote-first strategies. Most were simply focused on solving for ongoing operations as a temporary reaction to the pandemic. Yet early indicators did point to a future in which companies would be shedding office space, as some expiring leases were not replaced. This, coupled with the addition of new supply, caused a big increase in vacancy to nearly 12% by year end. Despite this large uptick, the brunt of the sluggish demand dynamic was being felt in the sublease markets, where rental economics more accurately reflected the true state of the market. Despite a total closing of the office market in 2020, average asking rents ended the year off just 6% from the pre-pandemic high.
In the years leading up to the pandemic, most medium and small companies defined their office space need based on headcount (current and projected), space programming, and industry/sector norms. The exercise was mostly formulaic. The primary differences in the offices of a small, regional law firm compared to those of an AM Law 100 firm would be scale, the cost of finishes, and the quality of the building and views. It was planning for the same outcome, just at different levels on the cost spectrum. Companies having a larger portfolio of offices would typically create a “workplace strategy” that included guidelines around programming (e.g., space layout, office size, critical adjacencies, growth factor, finishes, FF&E, etc.). These guidelines could then be used to inform the real estate process across geography.
Negotiations are always about (or should always be about) this or that. There’s always something else, maybe that something else is nothing (as in sometimes the best thing to do is nothing at all). Decisions made without proper consideration of all relevant alternative scenarios are decisions made poorly. As important, in the context of office lease negotiations, the best negotiated outcomes are directly correlated to the extent to which we understand the alternatives of the landlord counterparty. This is a bit counter intuitive, allow us to explain.
A little AI distraction to cheer your day (and relieve us of yet another discussion about workplace). Ever wandered through the streets and felt like you've stepped into the future? With their undeniable presence here in San Francisco, the driverless car is quickly becoming the most prominent representation of AI in our daily lives. If you spend any time in San Francisco neighborhoods, you can’t miss them. The other day, as I chatted with a neighbor, I counted 6 autonomous vehicles casually cruise by our front door within a span of 10 minutes. Intriguing, right? And today, in a twist of irony, I was held up by one. Blocked by a double-parked UPS truck, the driverless car hesitated, unsure about navigating into the lane of oncoming traffic. Of course, all the drivers in the opposing lane weren’t too keen to make space for the driverless car, as one normally would (or at least the more decent among us would) for a human-driven vehicle. Hence, we waited.
Imagine you invested in an office building in San Francisco in 2015. At the time, the building was 95% occupied. You paid $750/sf for the building and secured a loan on 50% of the value at the rate of 3.5%. 50% of the building’s tenant leases rolled in 2023/2024, a fact you underwrote as opportunity, opportunity to increase net operating income by achieving higher rents. Then the pandemic hit.
Over the past several years, the market value of San Francisco office buildings has dropped by more than 30%. Indeed, in some cases, asset values have declined much more, as evidenced by valuations associated with vacancy-challenged asset sales over the past couple of years. Importantly, a large percentage of the San Francisco office market either traded or was financed in the years prior to the pandemic, when valuations were high and debt was cheap. These activities created increased tax revenue for the city.
Office lease negotiations are complex, involving numerous parties (the principals and their advisors), and covering a wide range of issues, from economic to legal. The most effective negotiators are those who possess both a deep understanding of the markets, and the ability to actively listen while negotiating.
Strategy is to occupier real estate what a recipe is to a great meal. A recipe is more than the sum of its parts. It’s about how each ingredient is prepared, how and when it’s added to the mix. As with any recipe in which there are primary ingredients, vital to its success, similarly, every great strategy requires 3 main parts:
The so called “blend and extend” deal structure has a number of applications, among them a scenario in which a landlord might account for a downward adjustment to a tenant’s rent by amortizing the value of the adjustment with interest into a new term. Say, for example, a tenant has 3 years remaining on a lease and the market value for the space has dropped from $75/sf to $60/sf. The landlord would adjust the rate to market ($60/sf) and spread the $15/sf differential over the new term. If the interest rate were 8%, and the term 7-years, this would add $2.80/sf to the rent.
Throughout 2020, the prevailing sentiment among investors in the San Francisco office market was one of relative optimism. After all, despite the fact tenants were prohibited from occupying their buildings, they continued to collect full rent. The buildings were full, with vacancy hovering around 4%. Sure, companies weren’t happy about paying for space they couldn’t use, but business was good. In many cases the tech sector (which makes up most of San Francisco’s office occupancy) was booming due to an even greater reliance on and usage of tech caused by pandemic driven changes in how people were living. Throughout the course of 2020 there was no reason for San Francisco investors to panic, as few (if any) office occupiers were showing signs of developing long-term hybrid or remote-first strategies. Most were simply focused on solving for ongoing operations as a temporary reaction to the pandemic. Yet early indicators did point to a future in which companies would be shedding office space, as some expiring leases were not replaced. This, coupled with the addition of new supply, caused a big increase in vacancy to nearly 12% by year end. Despite this large uptick, the brunt of the sluggish demand dynamic was being felt in the sublease markets, where rental economics more accurately reflected the true state of the market. Despite a total closing of the office market in 2020, average asking rents ended the year off just 6% from the pre-pandemic high.
Leases vary by building, by market, and by market circumstances. In most major metros, when dealing with larger buildings, the lease document is sophisticated and complex, addressing a broad range of variables that will have a material impact on the occupier’s experience at the building, as well as its cost of occupancy. If you’ve done a good job negotiating the letter of intent, you should begin the lease negotiation phase from a position of relative strength. However, even when the letter of intent is fully maximized, there’s still a lot to negotiate in the lease.
You’ve identified the purpose behind your physical space needs, you’ve created a thorough project budget and schedule, and you’ve developed the right strategy. It’s now time to implement a market process.
What is “…a market process”? In the context of office leasing, market process is how you engage the market. It ties to your strategy, with sensitivity to the objectives you seek to accomplish. The market is where you implement your strategy, where you take it from theory to reality.
Many business executives know how to negotiate. Indeed, it’s a vital skillset essential to advancement in nearly all careers. But not all negotiations are equal. Negotiating leases on behalf of office tenants, for example, is a specialized undertaking. As with all negotiations, successful tenant lease negotiations are highly correlated with understanding the motivations of the counterparty. This means knowing everything about the landlord, including the equity and debt positions, the investment thesis, the leasing dynamic at the building (vacancy, lease rollover, etc.), the value of any recently completed comparable lease transactions in the building and in the market, and the overall market dynamic. These factors are fundamental to assessing leverage. Yet even when these basic elements are in place, the act of exercising leverage also requires special skills.
WALT, or weighted average lease term, is an essential metric in the valuation of office buildings as it forecasts the stability of future cash flow. WALT was less important back when office markets like San Francisco were seeing aggressive year over year rent growth. Back then vacancy was worth more than leased space, the theory being a buyer could take advantage of vacant space to capture higher rent (necessary to justify inflated pricing which baked in aggressive rent growth assumptions). However, in the broader historical context of valuation, the idea that vacancy is worth more than occupancy is antithetical to defining value. Indeed, the more prevalent (and logical) approach to value hinges on the quality and duration of the net operating income. Of course, this approach is less sexy as it disables a seller’s capacity to “sell the dream”. The buyer is buying stability and yield, both of which are measurable going in.
